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  1. #301  
    Quote Originally Posted by daThomas
    Oh and Hobbes. Please remove the blatant lie from your post above regarding: "Democrats Ask Freed Hostage to Apologize to Terrorists After Praising Bush and Blair". It's not fair to the people that are supposedly being quoted.
    I think you are right......after I did a quick search and could not find ANY other mention of those quotes, I email the site that posted it and they have not responded. So until they can provide any other reference or confirmation, I did remove it.

    The last thing I want is slander on any side.

    EDIT: I got a response from him:

    Sorry for the misunderstanding, it's a satirical website. Think "The Daily Show" for conservatives. Although I know the left is so radical these days that the quotes could actually be believed. :-)
    The Quote I originally found was on another website, that was quoting as a legit news article from Washington DC.
    Last edited by HobbesIsReal; 07/06/2005 at 01:23 PM.
  2. #302  
    That's very kewl, thanks. Yea, I googled and News-googled a phrase from the quote and got only one site.
  3. #303  
    Quote Originally Posted by HobbesIsReal
    The last thing I want is slander on any side.
    Sometimes "slander" makes a better story
    Well behaved women rarely make history
  4. #304  
    Quote Originally Posted by daThomas
    This mentions nothing about Aruba.

    Just giving you a hard time, didn't think you'd take it seriously (that's why I had the big in my post!)
    MaxiMunK.com The Forum That Asks, "Are You Not Entertained?"

    Remember: "Anyone that thinks the Treo should just work right out of the box, shouldn't own a Treo..."
  5. #305  
    You disagreeingly (new word) agreed with what I was saying!

    Quote Originally Posted by daThomas
    Oh cripes. That old story. Come on. Never was that person associated with the Hussein Regime.
    That was the point of the link to show that this is NOT a new story, but that maybe we are now starting to get some more detailed answers concerning it. Newly developing information on an older story is NOT propaganda.....it is simply the latest developments and examining the possibilities.


    Quote Originally Posted by daThomas
    This "intel" is being "talked about" NOT shown.
    Again....that is why I said that it is a newly developing story that still needs to be confirmed.

    The point is that we don't know yet, EITHER way for sure. Information on the reality of the situation is still coming in. This is simply new developments to keep an eye on to see what it will confirm or not.
    Last edited by HobbesIsReal; 07/11/2005 at 12:52 PM.
  6. #306  
    An article referencing testimony given about the foiled Jordian attack with WMDs

    The case of Iraq's weapons is not closed

    Within a long, convoluted answer to a softball question tossed him by MSNBC's Chris Matthews on his "Hardball" program Tuesday, Sen. John Kerry said something remarkable:

    "It appears, as we peel away the weapons of mass destruction issue, and -- we may yet find them, Chris," Kerry said. "Look, I want to make it clear: Who knows if a month from now, you find some weapons. You may."

    Kerry's response undercuts the Democratic meme that "Bush lied!" about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

    Perhaps Kerry was hedging because the night before Jordanian television had broadcast the confessions of the surviving suspects in an al-Qaida plot to attack the U.S. embassy in Amman and the headquarters of the Jordanian intelligence service with 20 tons of explosives and deadly chemicals.

    "Shown in a casual interview setting, detainees Azmi al-Jayousi and Hussein Sharif Hussein provided calm descriptions of a plot they say was hatched in Iraq and forged in Syria and Iraq," wrote the Chicago Tribune's Evan Osnos.

    The explosives and chemicals were to be carried in three trucks with reinforced bumpers for crashing through gates. The explosives were to be just enough to create a poisonous cloud of blister, choking and nerve agents. (In the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the terrorists used too much explosive, and the chemicals in the van were consumed in the blast.) The conspirators said they hoped to kill as many as 80,000 people.

    ----------------

    "We have six or seven credible reports of Iraqi weapons being moved into Syria before the war," a senior administration official told Kenneth Timmerman of Insight magazine.

    A Syrian intelligence officer, in letters smuggled to an anti-regime activist in Paris, identified three sites in Syria where Iraqi WMD are being stored, Timmerman said. The sites were the same as those identified earlier by a Syrian journalist who defected to Europe.

    --------------

    Syria's defense ministry has been smuggling missiles and weapons of mass destruction components to Sudan in an apparent effort to conceal them from Western inspection, Middle East Newsline reported last week. "Western intelligence sources said the regime of Syrian president Bashar Assad has been flying shipments of Scud C and Scud D extended-range missiles as well as WMD components to warehouses in Khartoum since at least January 2004," MENL said. "The sources said the Syrian shipments to Khartoum were placed on civilian airliners but were authorized and directed by the Defense Ministry."

    MENL said Sudanese President Omar Bashir was unaware of the Syrian shipments. When he learned of them, Bashir ordered that the missiles and WMD components be returned to Syria, Arab diplomatic sources said.

    -------------------

    Charles Duelfer, the chief weapons inspector in Iraq, said that a primary source for funding Saddam's illicit weapons programs was kickbacks on contracts set up under the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program.

    http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04123/309356.stm
    Jack Kelly is national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo, Ohio , jkelly@post-gazette.com, 412-263-1476
  7. #307  
    Here is another interview from yesterday as a follow up to many of these claims:

    LINK AND VIDEO OF INTERVIEW

    Saddam Hussein and Usama Bin Laden Link?
    Tuesday, July 12, 2005

    PHOTOS VIDEO

    This is a partial transcript of "Special Report With Brit Hume," July 8, 2005, that has been edited for clarity.

    Watch "Special Report With Brit Hume" weeknights at 6 p.m. ET

    (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

    JOHN EDWARDS, FORMER VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: The connection between Al Qaeda (search) and Saddam Hussein (search) is tenuous at best.

    SEN. JOHN KERRY (D), MASSACHUSETTS: There's no connection to Al Qaeda at that point in time.

    SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D), CALIFORNIA: There was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with bin Laden. Iraq doesn't come very high in the estimation of Usama bin Laden (search). He thinks of Hussein as an apostate, an infidel, or someone who is not worthy of being a fellow Muslim.

    (END VIDEO CLIP)

    BRIT HUME, HOST: Those comments reflect the conventional wisdom that there was really no connection between Saddam Hussein's government and Usama bin Laden and other Islamic terrorists. But a year ago, Stephen Hayes of our sister publication, the Weekly Standard, published a book documenting connections between Saddam Hussein's regime and Islamic terrorism, including Al Qaeda.

    Now he reports in the new edition of the Weekly Standard there is more evidence on the subject. And he joins me here now.

    Steve, welcome. Nice to have you.

    STEPHEN F. HAYES, THE WEEKLY STANDARD: Good to be with you.

    HUME: Sum up, if it's possible to do so, sort of the nature of the connections you found between the Islamic terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, that you knew before.

    HAYES: There are a whole host of connections from before that we knew before the war. There were allegations that have since been confirmed that Saddam was supporting Al Qaeda in Ansar al-Islam, an Al Qaeda affiliate, in northern Iraq, financially with weapons. There were, of course, the reports that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was in Iraq operating freely before the war.

    HUME: That's been confirmed?

    HAYES: That's been confirmed.

    HUME: That he was there before the war?

    HAYES: Absolutely. It was in the Butler Report, which was the British report looking back at prewar intelligence. It was in the Senate Intelligence Committee Report in this time last year, looking back at prewar intelligence. And we also have numerous interviews with people who were in Baghdad with Zarqawi before the war who are saying, "Yes, we were there with him."

    HUME: All right. That gives a sense of it. Now, what has since come to light since your book was published, new information that's come out? What's the nature of it?

    HAYES: I think that the most interesting stuff that we've seen -- and we've only really scratched the surface on this -- comes from internal Iraqi intelligence documents that have been uncovered since the end of the war. So it's no longer a matter of, "Well, do we have to take this person's word for it? These are allegations, but they've not yet been proven."

    We now know from the Iraqis, for instance, that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, that Saddam at least agreed on some limited cooperation broadcasting anti-Saudi propaganda. It was a request that he got from bin Laden in the mid-'90s. He agreed to do that.

    We know that there have been payments, additional payments, from Saddam to bin Laden's No. 2 in 1998.

    HUME: That was then Ayman al-Zawahiri?

    HAYES: Exactly. Exactly.

    HUME: What were the nature of the payments? What were they for?

    HAYES: $300,000. There's a period in February of 1998 in which this relationship really seemed to blossom. It was a time when there was lots of pressure put on by the U.S. for Saddam to comply with inspectors. He wasn't doing it. President Clinton went to the Pentagon, gave a big speech, basically preparing the nation for war. And at that time, we know that there was this payment to Zawahiri for $300,000.

    HUME: Do we know what it was for?

    HAYES: We don't know what it was for. There was also, in these documents that we've uncovered since the end of the war, a series of meetings in March of 1998 between a senior Al Qaeda terrorist, someone that the documents label "a trusted confidant of bin Laden."

    HUME: No name attached?

    HAYES: No name attached.

    HUME: And he met with whom?

    HAYES: He met with Iraqi intelligence officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi intelligence service. Really, these are accounting documents that were found in the bombed-out headquarters of Iraqi intelligence service. And what they say is, "Hey, we're going to pick up the tab for this guy. Let the Saudi station chief of Iraqi intelligence know that we're going to pay for this. Let the Sudanese station chief know that we're going to pay for this."

    And the meetings...

    HUME: Do we know the purpose of this relationship at that time?

    HAYES: We don't. I mean, you know, we can speculate, but we don't really know exactly what was going on at that time, except that there was a lot of pressure coming from the United States and the United Nations. We know that Usama bin Laden, on February 23rd, issued a fatwa that was very focused on Iraq.

    He called for the killing of Americans and the targeting of American interests wherever they could be found at a time when the Iraqis were really under pressure, as I say, from the international community. And then following that, there was a series of meetings that we know from Iraqi intelligence documents.

    And there was also a mention of March 1998 meetings in the 9/11 Commission report. So it's possible that, you know, you have a handful of meetings in really a month-and-a-half span.

    We don't yet know what came of these meetings, but there are some suggestive clues. There was a document that came out of the Pentagon which describes an Al Qaeda detainee, held down in Guantanamo Bay right now, who allegedly conspired with Iraqi intelligence to blow up the U.S. embassies in Pakistan in 1998.

    HUME: Now, this man was -- he's at Guantanamo. And he's someone who had been an Iraqi soldier?

    HAYES: Exactly.

    HUME: Correct? And then he was recruited by the Taliban.

    HAYES: In 1994, in Baghdad.

    HUME: In Baghdad. And went to Afghanistan...

    HAYES: Right.

    HUME: ... and fought there?

    HAYES: Fought there.

    HUME: Now, do we have reason to believe that when he did all this that he had been encouraged to do so by the Iraqi authorities? Or do we...

    HAYES: We don't. We don't yet know really what the disposition of his travels were. We do know that he'd taken money from Al Qaeda, that he swore -- took a pledge of biat to the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.

    HUME: Took a what?

    HAYES: A pledge of loyalty, essentially, to Mullah Omar.

    HUME: And so what we know about him, he was an Iraqi, right?

    HAYES: He was an Iraqi. But then the interesting part of this summary of evidence comes that he is alleged by the U.S. government formally to have participated in a plot to blow up the U.S. embassy and the British embassy in Pakistan in August of 1998.

    HUME: So whether he was at any time during all of that operating as an agent of Iraq, we don't know, but it's at least possible, because that's where he originally came from?

    HAYES: That's where he originally came from. But then the important component is that he was plotting this with a member of Iraqi intelligence.

    HUME: Oh, he was?

    HAYES: He was plotting this with Iraqi intelligence, according to this summary of evidence.

    HUME: All right. Now, you've talked about Iraqi intelligence repeatedly as being the locust of the contacts. How did Iraqi intelligence and perhaps Saddam, as well, regard Usama bin Laden? What did they think of him? How did they see him?

    HAYES: I would characterize it as sort of an on again, off again relationship. I mean, I don't think these guys were buddies by any stretch of the imagination, but they viewed each other as something that could be exploited.

    Saddam certainly called on Islamic radicals in his past. I mean, during the first Gulf War, he called on Islamic radicals to attack U.S. interests throughout the world. And he's done so since. He even held annual conferences in Baghdad bringing these terrorists.

    HUME: Now, you mentioned all these things, and there are obviously just -- there's more, and you're going to be reporting on this. The administration, however, has fallen silent on this.

    Last question. We only have a few seconds left. Why do you suppose the administration has fallen so silent on these contacts?

    HAYES: I don't think, frankly, that they want to fight with the CIA, many of whom were skeptical of this before. And, to be honest, if these links are indeed proven, they will have egg on their face.

    HUME: Got you. Steve, pleasure to have you. Thanks very much.
  8. #308  
    Oil-for-Food Paper Shredder Still Shredding

    http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162641,00.html

    The man who abruptly retired as Kofi Annan's cabinet chief after shredding papers related to the Oil-for-Food (search) program has been shredding still more documents at the United Nations, an eyewitness told FOX News.

    Iqbal Riza (search ), who has been working on a $1-a-year salary as a special advisor to Annan, has been shredding large quantities of unknown documents in his new 10th-floor U.N. office across the street from the U.N. Secretariat building, the source said.

    According to the eyewitness, a U.N. staffer who works on the same floor as Riza, the retired cabinet chief arrived within days of leaving his old job, loaded down with many cartons of papers and files.

    Riza was not in his new office daily, but every day he appeared, he would put large numbers of material through an office shredder located in a public area.

    "It became the office joke," said the eyewitness, who did not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals from superiors.

    ............................

    One fact undisclosed at the time of Annan's announcement was that it came on the same day Riza admitted to investigators with the Independent Inquiry Committee (search) into the Oil-for-Food program that he had destroyed documents related to the program.

    Two days before, when first interviewed by investigators for IIC Chairman Paul Volcker (search), he did not tell them that he approved the destruction of three years worth of documents.

    ...........................

    Volcker's panel was commissioned by Annan to investigate the multi-billion-dollar program, which aimed to relieve Iraqi civilians from some effects of the sanctions imposed on Iraq after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

    Saddam allegedly gave former government officials, activists, journalists and U.N. officials vouchers for Iraqi oil that could be resold. Investigators claim the former Iraqi regime may have illegally made more than $21 billion by cheating the program and through other sanctions-busting schemes.

    Among those accused of asking Saddam's regime for vouchers worth millions is Benon Sevan, hand-picked by Annan to run the entire Oil-for-Food program.
  9. #309  
    Iraq report focuses blame on CIA

    http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/i...lligence_x.htm

    Over the objections of Democrats, the Republican-controlled committee decided to put off until after the November election an inquiry into whether Bush administration officials went beyond the available intelligence reports in their claims about Iraq's weaponry. But there is no debate that the report paints a damning portrait of bungling intelligence agencies relying on dubious sources and faulty logic to arrive at dire warnings that have yet to be confirmed.

    The key word in the report is "overstated." The CIA overstated the case that Iraq possessed not just the ability to make chemical and biological weapons, but also the ingredients and the weapons themselves, the report says. The agency overstated the quality of its intelligence about supposed mobile biological-weapons-production labs. And its judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program "was not supported by the intelligence."

    Accounts of shortcomings, lapses and misjudgments abound in the report:

    • The CIA took four months to determine that documents crucial to the uranium charge "could be fraudulent." But it never circulated that Feb. 11, 2003, warning among administration officials who had been using that intelligence in making the case for war. U.N. officials needed only weeks to conclude in March 2003, days before the U.S.-led invasion, that the uranium documents were crude forgeries.

    • Tenet did not review an advance copy of Bush's State of the Union address in January 2003, which repeated the charge about Iraqi attempts to buy uranium in Africa. No one in the CIA office responsible for fact-checking intelligence-related portions of the speech remembers seeing a copy.

    • Although Tenet was responsible for reporting from all of the 15 military and civilian intelligence agencies, he told committee investigators that he was unaware of dissenting opinions about Iraq at those different agencies until just before completion of an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons programs.

    • After 1998, the CIA's Directorate of Operations, the clandestine service responsible for recruiting spies in foreign countries, had no human sources inside Iraq with access to information on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

    The report pointedly clears the Bush administration of the oft-repeated charge that it pressured the CIA into reaching a worst-case assessment of Iraqi weapons to help sell the war. None of the more than 200 intelligence analysts interviewed for the report said they were pressured to change their judgments.
  10. #310  
    http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/po...1weapons.html?

    August 1, 2005
    Spy's Notes on Iraqi Aims Were Shelved, Suit Says
    By JAMES RISEN NYTimes


    WASHINGTON, July 31 - The Central Intelligence Agency was told by an informant in the spring of 2001 that Iraq had abandoned a major element of its nuclear weapons program, but the agency did not share the information with other agencies or with senior policy makers, a former C.I.A. officer has charged.

    In a lawsuit filed in federal court here in December, the former C.I.A. officer, whose name remains secret, said that the informant told him that Iraq's uranium enrichment program had ended years earlier and that centrifuge components from the scuttled program were available for examination and even purchase.

    The officer, an employee at the agency for more than 20 years, including several years in a clandestine unit assigned to gather intelligence related to illicit weapons, was fired in 2004. In his lawsuit, he says his dismissal was punishment for his reports questioning the agency's assumptions on a series of weapons-related matters. Among other things, he charged that he had been the target of retaliation for his refusal to go along with the agency's intelligence conclusions...

    ...His information on the Iraqi nuclear program, described as coming from a significant source, would have arrived at a time when the C.I.A. was starting to reconsider whether Iraq had revived its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The agency's conclusion that this was happening, eventually made public by the Bush administration in 2002 as part of its rationale for war, has since been found to be incorrect...

    ...likened his client's situation to that of Valerie Wilson, also known as Valerie Plame, the clandestine C.I.A. officer whose role was leaked to the press after her husband publicly challenged some administration conclusions about Iraq's nuclear ambitions. (The former officer and Ms. Wilson worked in the same unit of the agency.)......The former officer's claims concerning his reporting on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program were not addressed in a report issued in March by the presidential commission that examined intelligence regarding such weapons in Iraq. ...

    ...informant reported that the Iraqi government had long since canceled its uranium enrichment program and that the C.I.A. could buy centrifuge components if it wanted to.

    The officer filed his reports with the Counter Proliferation Division in the agency's clandestine espionage arm. The reports were never disseminated to other American intelligence agencies or to policy makers, as is typically done, he charged.

    According to his suit, he was told that the agency already had detailed information about continuing Iraqi nuclear weapons efforts, and that his informant should focus on other countries...

    ...his reports about Iraq came just as the agency was fundamentally shifting its view of Iraq's nuclear ambitions. Throughout much of the 1990's, the C.I.A. and other United States intelligence agencies believed that Iraq had largely abandoned its nuclear weapons program. In December 2000, the intelligence agencies issued a classified assessment stating that Iraq did not appear to have taken significant steps toward the reconstitution of the program...

    ...that assessment changed in early 2001 - a critical period in the intelligence community's handling of the Iraqi nuclear issue, the commission concluded...
    Last edited by BARYE; 08/01/2005 at 01:54 PM.
    755P Sprint SERO (upgraded from unlocked GSM 650 on T-Mobile)
  11. #311  
    There are so many sides to take into account with the whole question of what information did the the Adminstration have at the time of the of making the decision to go into Iraq:

    • What the Admin knew and didn't know at the time of the decision.
    • All the possibilities of proof of what the admin may have swept under the carpet or scewed to better fit a potential predetermined conclusion, which are still currently in the process of being confirmed or debunked.
    • Multiple foreign intel confirming WMDs of one kind or another in various stages of development or deployable.
    • What the CIA actually told the Admin and what they withheld, discouraged, didn't connect the dots with, etc.... The CIA was only as good to the Pres as the report they filed for him to review.
    • What Saddam was saying. He lied when he was trying to develop Nukes, saying he wasn't. He lied when he wasn't, saying that he was. After 12 years he still never let the inspectors confirm his claims either way, without a bunch of run around that still left considerable doubt and lack of confirmation.
    • Developing accounts that Iraq may have been playing AQ games with possible WMD attacks against Jordan and US facalities in Jordan.
    • The Oil for Food scandal with a list of foriegn (and domestic) persons constantly growing deeper and wider with a large majority of them in or ties with the UN or in the opposing countries, i.e. Germany, France, etc.., with a growing range of influence on the factors at that time.


    One factor cannot be ignored when looking at any of them.

    .
    Last edited by HobbesIsReal; 08/01/2005 at 01:18 PM.
  12. #312  
    Quote Originally Posted by HobbesIsReal
    There are so many sides to take into account with the whole question of what information did the the Adminstration have at the time of the of making the decision to go into Iraq:

    • What the Admin knew and didn't know at the time of the decision.
    • All the possibilities of proof of what the admin may have swept under the carpet or scewed to better fit a potential predetermined conclusion, which are still currently in the process of being confirmed or debunked.
    • Multiple foreign intel confirming WMDs of one kind or another in various stages of development or deployable.
    • What the CIA actually told the Admin and what they withheld, discouraged, didn't connect the dots with, etc.... The CIA was only as good to the Pres as the report they filed for him to review.
    • What Saddam was saying. He lied when he was trying to develop Nukes, saying he wasn't. He lied when he wasn't, saying that he was. After 12 years he still never let the inspectors confirm his claims either way, without a bunch of run around that still left considerable doubt and lack of confirmation.
    • Developing accounts that Iraq may have been playing AQ games with possible WMD attacks against Jordan and US facalities in Jordan.
    • The Oil for Food scandal with a list of foriegn (and domestic) persons constantly growing deeper and wider with a large majority of them in or ties with the UN or in the opposing countries, i.e. Germany, France, etc.., with a growing range of influence on the factors at that time.


    One factor cannot be ignored when looking at any of them.

    .
    Yeah, there is no doubt that there are conflicting stories which only goes to the argument that a) our intel system isnt nearly as good as we think it is and b) at least for some, that we shouldnt be making war decisions on information this shakey.
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  13. #313  
    Quote Originally Posted by t2gungho
    Yeah, there is no doubt that there are conflicting stories which only goes to the argument that a) our intel system isnt nearly as good as we think it is and b) at least for some, that we shouldnt be making war decisions on information this shakey.
    Agreed, our intel probably needs a good shake down. But the other point is there are a lot of factors in that list that were totally outside of our control as well that complicates the whole issue to the umph degree.
  14. #314  
    I understand what you are saying Hobbes. I just see what you said as more evidence that we shouldn't act until we know that we can rely on what we have gathered and on what we have been told.

    I also understand that there will be circumstances that don't afford us that luxury as well.
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  15. #315  
    Again, I agree with you and I think that the next time we are in a similar position.....possibly like with Iran......there is going to be a higher bar of intel integrated that will be needed to pass the public approval threshold.

    But all of these factors that are now casting doubt on the intel then were not known at the time and are only now coming out, which is why I said several pages back that we have to look at the what we knew, or thought we possibly knew, at the time the decision was made vs the consequences of acting or not acting given the possibilities of that knowledge that may have appeared true and confirmed or at least highly probable.

    So, the next time we are looking at advancing the WOT with going into another country (i.e. Syria, Pak, Iran, etc...), no matter if it is Bush or the next Pres, he (or she) will have a lot harder sell.
  16. #316  
    Quote Originally Posted by HobbesIsReal
    Again, I agree with you and I think that the next time we are in a similar position.....possibly like with Iran......there is going to be a higher bar of intel integrated that will be needed to pass the public approval threshold.
    I think the bar was always set high - remember the Cuban missile crisis. JFK was able to provide incontrovertible proof to the UN about the missile build up in Cuba - data was collected by both satellite imagery as well as a daring recon mission.
    Blaming poor intel does not help our fix our credibility.
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  17. #317  
    I am not talking about fixing our credibility....but looking at the whole of the events at the time. Many have said that it was all just Bush screwing with the intel, but they are forgetting the fact there were so many other country’s intel agencies with similar confirmation reports to support the view of possibilities at the time....which may have been derived through of those involved in the Oil for Food scandal and Saddam's lies and unwillingness to confirm the truth of his Nuke and WMD status.

    Here is a post I had a few pages back rambling about the acting on intel: POST #202

    Did Bush lie? It is a very good question, and one that not only should be asded, but needs to be answered. But I just don't see that we have all the facts to hang him just yet.

    I am not defending or condemning either side of the issue, at least not at the moment as developing info is still coming in, but simply looking at all the factors involved that play a role in the question of this thread, as my only point was we can't ignore one of the aspects just to try to prove another.
  18. #318  
    Quote Originally Posted by HobbesIsReal
    I am not talking about fixing our credibility....but looking at the whole of the events at the time. Many have said that it was all just Bush screwing with the intel, but they are forgetting the fact there were so many other country’s intel agencies with similar confirmation reports to support the view of possibilities at the time....which may have been derived through of those involved in the Oil for Food scandal and Saddam's lies and unwillingness to confirm the truth of his Nuke and WMD status.
    I thought the leaked Downing street memo did indicate that British Intel came to conclusion (before invasion in 2003) that Iraq did not possess WMDs.
    So which other countries intel agencies confirmed the White House's assertion that Iraq WMDs were a threat?
    Why did the White House go to such lengths to discredit anyone (e.g. the whole sordid mess of Joe Wilson/Valerie Plame) who dared question their claims of Iraqi WMDs?
    And what does the Oil for Food scandal have anything to do with the these issues except to muddy the water?
    And it may not be as simple as whether the Prez lied or not as much as whether he was told only what he wanted to hear. The Commission on Intelligence Capabilities clearly laid the blame on the intel agencies - not just for faulty analysis but for faulty intelligence gathering.
    The question is, regardless of faulty intel on WMDs, was there sufficient intent on Iraq's part, to justify the war? Most of the 15 US intel agencies did concur on one point - that Iraq did not pose an "imminent threat".
    Granted that the alleged WMDs may have been a cover for a grander geopolitical strategy - but instead of denials, why hasn't the White House been more forthright and set the record straight?
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  19. #319  
    http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8853000/site/newsweek/

    CIA Commander: We Let bin Laden Slip Away

    Newsweek
    Aug. 15, 2005 issue

    During the 2004 presidential campaign, George W. Bush and John Kerry battled about whether Osama bin Laden had escaped from Tora Bora in the final days of the war in Afghanistan. Bush, Kerry charged, "didn't choose to use American forces to hunt down and kill" the leader of Al Qaeda.

    The president called his opponent's allegation "the worst kind of Monday-morning quarterbacking."

    Bush asserted that U.S. commanders on the ground did not know if bin Laden was at the mountain hideaway along the Afghan border
    .

    But in a forthcoming book, the CIA field commander for the agency's Jawbreaker team at Tora Bora, Gary Berntsen, says he and other U.S. commanders did know that bin Laden was among the hundreds of fleeing Qaeda and Taliban members. Berntsen says he had definitive intelligence that bin Laden was holed up at Tora Bora—intelligence operatives had tracked him—and could have been caught. "He was there," Berntsen tells NEWSWEEK. Asked to comment on Berntsen's remarks, National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones passed on 2004 statements from former CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks. "We don't know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001," Franks wrote in an Oct. 19 New York Times op-ed. "Bin Laden was never within our grasp." Berntsen says Franks is "a great American. But he was not on the ground out there. I was."

    In his book—titled "Jawbreaker"—the decorated career CIA officer criticizes Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Department for not providing enough support to the CIA and the Pentagon's own Special Forces teams in the final hours of Tora Bora, says Berntsen's lawyer, Roy Krieger. (Berntsen would not divulge the book's specifics, saying he's awaiting CIA clearance.) That backs up other recent accounts, including that of military author Sean Naylor, who calls Tora Bora a "strategic disaster" because the Pentagon refused to deploy a cordon of conventional forces to cut off escaping Qaeda and Taliban members. Maj. Todd Vician, a Defense Department spokesman, says the problem at Tora Bora "was not necessarily just the number of troops."...
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  20. NRG
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    Here is some more info to add to the collection.


    Source: NY Times


    Report Warned Bush Team About Intelligence Suspicions

    By DOUGLAS JEHL
    Published: November 6, 2005

    WASHINGTON, Nov. 5 - A high Qaeda official in American custody was identified as a likely fabricator months before the Bush administration began to use his statements as the foundation for its claims that Iraq trained Al Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons, according to newly declassified portions of a Defense Intelligence Agency document.

    The document, an intelligence report from February 2002, said it was probable that the prisoner, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, "was intentionally misleading the debriefers" in making claims about Iraqi support for Al Qaeda's work with illicit weapons.

    The document provides the earliest and strongest indication of doubts voiced by American intelligence agencies about Mr. Libi's credibility. Without mentioning him by name, President Bush, Vice President **** Cheney, Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, and other administration officials repeatedly cited Mr. Libi's information as "credible" evidence that Iraq was training Al Qaeda members in the use of explosives and illicit weapons.

    -snip-

    Mr. Libi was not alone among intelligence sources later determined to have been fabricating accounts. Among others, an Iraqi exile whose code name was Curveball was the primary source for what proved to be false information about Iraq and mobile biological weapons labs. And American military officials cultivated ties with Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, an exile group, who has been accused of feeding the Pentagon misleading information in urging war.

    -snip-

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